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NOTE†
THEIR BROTHERS’ KEEPERS:
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE IN THE
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURTS
KEENAN MOLASKEY*
I
INTRODUCTION
What procedure must a legal system establish to be considered legitimate by
the parties before it? How much information must a court collect, and in what
way, before rendering a decision? When rendering a decision, to what extent
must the court explain its reasoning and the facts that impacted its decision?
Scholars, politicians, and the courts themselves have long debated these
questions of procedural justice.1 Historically, this debate was largely normative
and theoretical.2 But in the 1970s, psychologists began to empirically study
whether individuals perceived court decisions as legitimate and whether certain
procedures might impact that perceived legitimacy.3
Procedural Justice Theory has grown out of this empirical research. It argues
that the level of procedure—comprised of the various procedural safeguards and
participation rights—provided in litigation impacts how parties perceive the
fairness of a court’s decision.4 This perception consequently impacts how likely
parties are to follow the court’s decision and the law more generally.5
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1. Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the Federal Courts, 63
HASTINGS L.J. 127, 138–40 (2011).
2. Id. at 140 (“The philosophical and legal theory perspectives . . . rely on philosophical
conceptions about the nature of procedural justice . . . .”).
3. See id. at 132–38 (discussing the empirical research developments on these issues since the
1970s).
4. See generally Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT’L J. PSYCHOL. 117
(2000) (explaining that criteria of procedural justice, like participation, neutrality and trustworthiness of
decision-makers, and dignity and respect, influence whether a party views the procedures and outcomes
as fair).
5. See id. at 119 (discussing research, for example, on how people who believe fair procedures
leading to a particular outcome are more likely to follow those outcomes over time).
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This field has primarily focused on studying and critiquing trial-level
litigation.6 But recent work has begun to explore how Procedural Justice Theory
might apply to the intermediate appellate courts (IAC),7 and initial results
support the notion that procedural justice principles apply on appeal.8
This Note considers the role of the IACs to propose a new theoretical
framework for applying Procedural Justice Theory to appellate procedure. The
unique position of the IACs within our broader legal system likely impacts how
their decisions and procedures affect parties. Parties may well bring their
perceptions of the trial court’s procedure to the appellate courts tasked with
reviewing the conclusions of the court below. If an IAC ignores a trial court’s
procedural failings—or, worse, reinforces them through its own failing—then it
risks compounding a party’s perception that the court system is illegitimate.
Applying this framework, this Note identifies two distinct categories of
procedural justice concerns that potentially arise in appellate litigation: discrete
concerns that arise on appeal in much the same way as at trial, and aggregate
concerns that incorporate potential procedural failings below.9 These concerns
might apply differently in various appeals and may cause parties bringing facially
similar appeals to perceive certain procedure in vastly different ways. Further,
these categories likely suggest the need for different types of reforms by the
IACs. Thus, both researchers and the courts may benefit from considering how
both discrete and aggregate procedural justice concerns might impact the parties
on appeal.
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part II provides more background on
procedural justice, both generally and in the IACs. Part III outlines the debate
over error correction in the IACs and, drawing on the error correction debate,
posits that the IACs’ position in the American legal system gives rise to both
discrete and aggregate procedural justice concerns. This Part further describes
how the two categories might differ in both application and remedy. Part IV
discusses asylum appeals in the Second Circuit to provide a real-world example
of aggregate procedural justice in action. Part V concludes.
II
THE PROCEDURAL JUSTICE DEBATE IN U.S. COURTS
Although decisions by the IACs have public value because of their
precedential effect on future litigation,10 they may only be issued on an actual
6. See Merritt E. McAlister, “Downright Indifference:” Examining Unpublished Decisions in the
Federal Courts of Appeals, 118 MICH. L. REV. 533, 565 (2020) (“There has been little work exploring the
experience of procedural justice in the specific context of appellate litigation.”).
7. See, e.g., id. (providing an overview of unpublished opinions at the federal appellate level and
discussing how unpublished opinions relate to procedural justice values).
8. Id. at 566 (citing Scott Barclay, A New Aspect of Lawyer-Client Interactions: Lawyers Teaching
Process-Focused Clients to Think About Outcomes, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 1 (2004)).
9. See infra Part III.
10. See McAlister, supra note 6, at 561 (discussing how unpublished opinions, despite having only
persuasive rather than precedential value, retain public value).
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dispute between two parties and have the greatest impact on the rights and
responsibilities of the parties to the appeal.11 Recognizing this effect on the
parties, scholars have begun to critique appellate procedure through the lens of
Procedural Justice Theory. This Part discusses the procedural justice debate, both
generally and in the IACs.
A. Procedural Justice: The Philosophical and Empirical Debate
Philosophers and legal scholars have long debated the question of what
constitutes “due” or “fair” process in adjudication.12 Participants in this debate
have largely fallen into two camps: one camp focused on the outcome of the
adjudication and the so-called dignitary camp focused on the process itself.13
The outcome camp argues that any legal system should, as its central goal,
seek to maximize “substantively accurate outcomes.”14 From this central goal,
courts should establish a procedure for adjudication that most likely leads to
correct decisions.15 Some procedures—including the opportunity for parties to
brief the issues and arguments—help the adjudicator arrive at a correct result,
while others—such as the ability to physically stand before the judge for
argument—may not further that goal in every case. Thus, according to the
outcome focused camp, courts should add or remove procedure to efficiently
minimize the chance of substantive error.16
Conversely, the dignitary camp argues that procedure has intrinsic value
independent from the ultimate decision. For example, Lawrence Tribe describes
a party’s procedural right to be heard as “analytically distinct from the right to
secure a different outcome.”17 According to the dignitary camp, the societal
benefits flowing from participation in the adjudication of one’s legal rights are
themselves fundamental to a legal system. Thus, on this theory, courts should
establish a level of procedure that maximizes those benefits.18
Historically, this debate was largely theoretical and conceptual, focusing on
the theoretical demands and the potential impact of specific procedures on

11. The impact on the parties is most direct in the case of unpublished opinions, which have only
limited precedential value and constitute the majority of decisions rendered by the IACs. See id. at 561,
551 fig.2 (citing ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S. COURTS tbl.B12 (2018)).
12. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 1, at 130 (discussing the varied debate over the term as used
within and between fields).
13. Id. at 138.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 138–39.
17. Id. at 139 (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 667 (2d ed.
1988)).
18. See id. (“As Tribe explained, ‘At stake here is not just the much-acclaimed appearance of justice
but, from a perspective that treats process as intrinsically significant, the very essence of justice.’”).
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hypothetical litigation.19 In the mid-1970s, however, psychologists brought a
subjective and empirical lens to the debate. Specifically, researchers began
studying why people followed the law, focusing on whether certain procedures in
an adjudication improved the likelihood that individuals would accept the results
of a negative decision.20
The results of these studies suggest that the procedure afforded to parties
impacts the likelihood that they will accept and adhere to an adverse decision.21
When faced with a negative outcome, parties who feel that they were treated
fairly during the dispute are more likely to view the decisionmaker as legitimate.22
This legitimacy leads to greater respect for the negative decision and a greater
likelihood that the parties will follow it.23 Conversely, parties who feel that an
authority treated them unfairly are more likely to view the authority as less
legitimate. Consequently, those parties are less likely to obey both the specific
decision and other laws imposed by that authority.24 The research further
suggests that, while litigants care most about the outcomes of litigation, they also
independently care about how they perceive the system’s fairness.25
This perception—the fairness of the authority—can be impacted by different
procedures implemented in the adjudication.26 Specifically, Tom R. Tyler has
identified four principles of procedural justice that contribute to a party’s
perception of the fairness of an adjudication: (1) the extent to which the party
believes she had an opportunity to be heard, (2) the neutrality of the forum, (3)
the trustworthiness of the decisionmaker, and (4) the degree of dignity and
respect afforded to the party.27 These operate in tandem, and certain procedural
rules may impact multiple considerations.28
First, parties place significant weight on “the opportunity to express their
views to decision-makers.”29 Specifically, parties value participation even when
they know that it “will not meaningfully affect the decision.”30 Thus, courts can
19. See id. at 149 (describing legal procedural due process as “explicitly normative” and “rely[ing]
on philosophical conceptions about the nature of procedural justice rather than on any empirical
research”).
20. See, e.g., JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS (1975).
21. See, e.g., McAlister, supra note 6 at 566 & nn.175–76 (citing TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY
THE LAW 107–08 (1990)).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See id. at 563 (“That is not to say that outcomes are irrelevant to litigants, but it is to say that the
treatment litigants receive matters independently.” (citing Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 1, at 137)).
26. See Tyler, supra note 5, at 121 (“[A]uthorities that use fair decision-making procedures are
viewed as more legitimate, and people more willingly defer to their decisions.”).
27. Id. at 121–23.
28. See McAlister, supra note 6, at 564–65 (discussing how reasoned explanations improve a party’s
belief in the trustworthiness and neutrality of the tribunal, as well as the dignity and respect shown to the
party).
29. Tyler, supra note 5, at 121.
30. Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 1, at 136.

06_MOLASKEY (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 3 2021]

9/15/2021 1:00 PM

THEIR BROTHERS’ KEEPERS

85

support procedural justice (and improve their own legitimacy) by providing the
opportunity for argument even when it will not affect the outcome of litigation.
This consideration may be further enhanced by the way decisionmakers present
their decisions. For example, Tyler suggests that litigants are more likely to
accept a decision when the judge tells them that “[their] views were considered
but (unfortunately) could not influence the decision . . . .”31
Similarly, the neutrality of the forum and trustworthiness of the
decisionmaker are two related but distinct factors impacting a party’s assessment
of the “quality of decision making” and consequently the fairness of the process.32
Parties view the forum as neutral if decisionmakers are impartial and objective,
and do not allow personal bias to impact their decisions.33 Decisionmakers are
trustworthy when they show that they care about the parties and try to make a
fair decision.34
Finally, parties respect decisions reached by adjudicators who treat them with
dignity and respect throughout the process. Dignity and respect can be shown by
listening to the parties, taking their arguments seriously, and providing a rational
decision that explains what motivated each conclusion.35
Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff further theorizes that the identity of the parties
may impact their experiences and ultimate conclusions regarding the fairness of
adjudication.36 For example, natural persons—especially the most vulnerable
members of society—may experience all procedural justice failures more acutely
than corporations or other “repeat players.”37
Critical race theory scholars condemn this focus on procedure, arguing that it
obscures the law’s substantive impact on systemic inequality and racism and
undermines substantive change.38 Their claims are valid: No amount of
procedural window dressing can fix substantive law that harms people. But
procedural justice exists outside substantive law; it can undermine just laws and
compound the negative effects of harmful ones. For this reason, it is worth
31. See McAlister, supra note 6, at 564 (quoting TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 149
(1990)).
32. Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST.
283, 298 (2003); see also Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 1, at 136 (“Neutrality and trust are distinct but
related factors.”).
33. Tyler, supra note 5, at 122.
34. Id.
35. McAlister, supra note 6, at 564–65.
36. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 1, at 147–49 (describing how procedural justice compares
between corporate entities and individuals).
37. Id.; see also McAlister, supra note 6, at 566–67 (“Natural persons, as opposed to the corporate
appellants who dominate the first tier, may be more affected by these experiences. And society’s most
vulnerable members—including the poor and the prisoners who often proceed pro se on appeal—may
experience procedural justice failures more acutely, as they injure self-esteem and threaten group
inclusion.”).
38. For example, Monica C. Bell argues that a focus on procedural justice implies that the problem
of policing is rooted at some level in African Americans’ refusal to follow the law, rather than “race- and
class-subjugation.” Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE
L.J. 2054, 2061 (2017).
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considering how procedure and procedural justice interact with substantive law.39
B. Appellate Procedural Justice
Much of the procedural justice debate has focused on adjudications of first
instance—that is, trial litigation.40 In the last thirty years, however, scholars have
begun expanding the debate to consider the procedure given to parties on
appeal.41
The relative recency of this debate is largely explained by the historical
procedure afforded by the Circuit Courts. Prior to the 1970s nearly every federal
appeal received the “Learned Hand Model” of appellate procedure, the
sufficiency of which was never in doubt.42 Under this model, every party to the
appeal had the opportunity to brief their argument.43 A three-judge panel heard
oral argument, followed by a panel conference where the judges met to discuss
their decisions.44 One judge prepared a draft opinion, which was reviewed by the
rest of the panel.45 The authoring judge incorporated any notes before issuing a
final opinion, which stated the facts and issue, the relevant law, the court’s
analysis, and the holding.46 Finally, the remaining judges could dissent or concur
to present their own decision on the issue.
The time and effort demanded by this lengthy review, and a growing federal
docket crisis, put increasing strain on the Circuit Courts throughout the second
half of the 20th Century.47 In response to this crisis, the Circuit Courts
implemented “modern case management”—relaxing the level of procedure
afforded to certain cases in pursuit of judicial efficiency.48 The number of cases
receiving oral argument decreased, and the rate of summary disposition through
unpublished opinions—shorter, party-oriented opinions often without a formal
author—increased.49 Judges also began relying more heavily on clerks to screen
cases and in some instances draft opinions.50
39. In this note, I do not propose enhanced procedure as a panacea. Rather, I hope to suggest that
a lack of procedure may obscure substantive harms and compound their impact on affected parties.
40. See McAlister, supra note 6, at 565 & n.167 (“There has been little work exploring the experience
of procedural justice in the specific context of appellate litigation.”).
41. See id. at 565–66 (citing Scott Barclay, A New Aspect of Lawyer-Client Interactions: Lawyers
Teaching Process-Focused Clients to Think About Outcomes, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 1 (2004)).
42. Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and Case Management in the
Circuit Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315, 374 (2011); see also, William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds,
Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L.
REV. 273, 278 (1996).
43. Richman & Reynolds, supra note 42, at 278.
44. The Evarts Act of 1891, which established the modern structure of the United States Courts of
Appeals, originally allotted three circuit judges to each circuit, all of whom heard every appeal. See
Judiciary (Evarts) Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891).
45. Richman & Reynolds, supra note 42, at 278.
46. Id.
47. Levy, supra note 42, at 321.
48. Id. at 321–22.
49. Id. at 322–23.
50. Id. at 323.
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In response to this modern case management, the procedural justice debate
turned to appellate procedure. In the 1990s, William Richman and William
Reynolds authored Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari,51 highlighting
and criticizing the relaxations of the Learned Hand Model.52 These “shortcuts to
decision making,” they argue, lead to lower quality decisions that increase error
rates and leave the law underdeveloped.53
More importantly, they identify a trend in these shortcuts: the Circuit Courts
focus all the procedural shortcuts onto specific categories of cases, functionally
creating two tiers of appellate procedure.54 Tier-one cases—those continuing to
receive the Learned Hand Model—involve wealthy and connected parties or
disputed issues of law.55 Tier-two cases—the targets of every single procedure
limiting change—involve claims of error arising from prisoners, pro se litigants,
and other marginalized members of the community.56 The collective effect of all
these shortcuts, they argue, is to turn the IACs into functional certiorari courts
for the most vulnerable members of society. This change threatens “the basic
guarantee of justice to all in equal measure” and undermines the “perceived
legitimacy” of the IACs.57 Following this seminal work, other scholars have used
procedural justice theory to analyze appellate procedure.58
While scholars have expanded the theoretical debate to appellate procedure,
empirical procedural justice theory has largely remained rooted in trial litigation.
Indeed, Tyler’s research and subsequent replication studied adjudications of first
instance.59 In recent history, however, some limited empirical studies on appellate
litigation have supported the notion that the four elements of procedural justice
identified by Tyler’s findings also apply on appeal. In one notable study of
appellate procedural justice, Scott Barclay interviewed 125 civil litigants and
found that they often considered goals other than outcome when deciding to
appeal their case.60 Most notably, litigants may take an appeal “in order to have
[their] story taken seriously” by the IAC even when the odds of success are very
low.61 These recent theoretical and empirical expansions suggest that procedural
justice research in the IACs is a burgeoning field that will likely see increased
study in the near future.

51. Richman & Reynolds, supra note 42.
52. Id. at 278.
53. Id. at 294–95.
54. Id. at 293–94.
55. Id. at 296.
56. Id. at 295–96.
57. Id. at 297.
58. See generally, McAlister, supra note 6 (theorizing that the elements of procedural justice might
apply in the appellate courts much as they do at trial).
59. Id. at 565.
60. Scott Barclay, A New Aspect of Lawyer-Client Interactions: Lawyers Teaching Process-Focused
Clients to Think About Outcomes, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 5 (2004).
61. Id. at 8.
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III
DISCRETE AND AGGREGATE PROCEDURAL JUSTICE IN THE IACS
As the empirical analysis of procedural justice in the IACs grows more robust,
it will be helpful to consider how the position of the IACs within the broader
legal system may impact how parties experience appellate procedure.
Specifically, the decision and procedure afforded to the parties below likely
impacts how they experience the procedure on appeal. This impact leads to two
distinct conceptualizations of procedural justice in the IACs: a discrete
conceptualization that requires a certain level of procedure to adjudicate the
appeal, and an aggregate conceptualization that tasks the IACs with addressing
potential procedural deficiencies experienced in the trial below.
To explicate this dichotomy more fully, it is helpful to first consider a different
debate in the IACs: the debate over the proper conception of error correction in
the Circuit Courts.
A. The Error Correction Debate in the IACs
Most contemporary discussions identify two primary functions of the United
States Circuit Courts: error correction and law development.62 The error
correction role—reviewing the trial below to “ensure that an appropriate and just
outcome has been reached”63—is often considered the core historical justification
for the appeal as of right.64 Indeed, because “[e]very appeal necessarily involves
at least one claim that the trial court erred,” the Circuit Courts’ law development
function—deciding how an open question of law should apply to the facts—
formally operates as a collateral consequence of error correction.65 The overlap
between these roles has led some to conceptualize the dichotomy as merely a
difference in the difficulty of the question before the IACs: error correction
applies to “easy cases” where settled law clearly controls the issue, and law
development applies to “hard questions” where the IAC must fill gaps in the
law.66
Even after removing hard questions from consideration, “[t]here are
countless possible variations of error.”67 The Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure direct the Circuit Courts to identify errors below and set aside verdicts
for “harmful error,” but never define “error.”68 Under this doctrinal ambiguity,
individual circuit judges must craft personal conceptualizations of error and, by

62. See, e.g., Jeffrey O. Cooper & Douglas A. Berman, Passive Virtues and Casual Vices in the
Federal Courts of Appeals, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 685, 712 (2000).
63. Id.
64. See Paul D. Carrington, The Function of the Civil Appeal: A Late-Century View, 38 S.C. L. REV.
411, 412–14 (1987) (describing the historical approach to appeals in the United States, where district court
judges and supreme court justices would form temporary panels to review decisions for error).
65. Chad M. Oldfather, Error Correction, 85 IND. L.J. 49, 64 (2010).
66. See, e.g., id. at 65.
67. Id. at 56 (quoting ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 16 (1970)).
68. Id. at 55–56.
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extension, the court’s error correction role. Chad Oldfather surveyed the Circuit
Courts, and identifies two broad conceptualizations of error correction, which he
argues are rooted in prevailing legal theories.69
First, he identifies a case-based conceptualization of error that finds support
in legal realism.70 Under this approach, the court primarily asks whether the
“right” party prevailed below.71 This approach, he argues, collapses into a
“relatively broad and unconstrained focus on the justness of the trial court’s
overall resolution.”72 Though the parties may identify actual conduct below that
constitutes legal error, that conduct takes a back seat to the ultimate disposition.
Following this lodestar, courts may ignore “technicalities” if they conclude that
the correct party prevailed below, or they may conversely reverse the decision
below “regardless of what the parties had put before it” where it seems the wrong
party prevailed.73
Second, Oldfather argues for reconceptualizing the error correction role
through the lens of legal process theory. In this conceptualization, he casts the
appeal as a derivative dispute—a discrete claim that the other party was unjustly
enriched by an erroneous judgment.74 This conceptualization prioritizes the
specific issue raised, rather than the ultimate disposition of the case below.75 A
court approaching error correction in this way considers first and foremost
whether the party’s discrete appeal—that is, the claim of error—has legal merit,
regardless of who prevailed below.76 This approach, he argues, better emphasizes
the parties, and maintains the legitimacy of the appeals process.77
This debate reveals a broader dichotomy in how the IACs and litigants might
conceptualize the role of the IACs within the legal system. On the aggregate, or
case-based conceptualization, the IACs exist as one link in the chain that is a
multi-tiered legal system constructed to resolve a core dispute. The appeals they
hear are intrinsically connected to the ultimate dispute, and parties experience
the appeal with an eye towards their entire case.
On the discrete, or issue-based conceptualization, the IACs exist as
independent adjudicatory bodies resolving a specific issue that may incidentally
impact some other dispute. The appeals they hear are self-contained disputes and
parties might experience the appeal much like they would a subsequent trial
against someone they have sued in the past.

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 77, 81.
Id. at 68–69.
Id. at 59–60.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 59.
Id. at 81.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 81–82.
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B. Discrete and Aggregate Procedural Justice Concerns
These two theories of error correction map relatively cleanly onto the
discussion of procedural justice in the IACs. Applying this dichotomy reveals the
two distinct categories of procedural justice concerns that may arise in appellate
procedure: discrete concerns and aggregate concerns.
1. Discrete Procedural Justice Concerns
Reflecting the issue-based conceptualization of the IACs, all appeals likely
raise procedural justice concerns as a new, discrete adjudication. When a party
appeals, the IAC becomes the court of first instance as it relates to the claim of
error. Oriented in this way, the four procedural justice considerations identified
by Tyler and others apply against an IAC in much the same way they would
against another trial court in a different litigation.78
In this light, appellate procedure matters to the parties independently when
the appeal commences. If appellants feel that they do not have the opportunity
to be heard on appeal, or that the IAC has not seriously considered their
arguments or sufficiently explained its reasoning in ruling against them, then they
may lose trust in the ability of the IACs to legitimately review cases.79
Further, because the appellate loser cares about the procedure on appeal
whether a loss is affirmed or win reversed, discrete procedural justice likely
applies categorically. This further reflects (at least theoretical)
conceptualizations of procedural justice in the trial courts.80 Because every party
to an appeal might lose the appeal, discrete procedural justice “can always be
discussed with respect to all parties.”81
2. Aggregate Procedural Justice Concerns
Aggregate procedural justice reflects a case-based approach that recognizes
the role of the IACs within the broader justice system. Every stage of litigation is
one in a series of connected interactions between parties and authority that
inform a party’s perception of the system’s fairness. At every link in this chain,
procedural deficiencies can undermine the party’s faith in that system. Parties do
not forget procedural failings when they proceed to the appeal. In fact, these
failings are often the reason for the appeal.82 Allowing such failings to continue
through the appellate system without redress reinforces and often compounds

78. See discussion supra Part II.A.
79. These legitimacy concerns may manifest in ways showing dissatisfaction with the IACs, but not
the entire system. For example, the filing of more petitions for certiorari at the Supreme Court, litigation
campaigns to change the law through repeated appeals, or attempts to narrow precedent from below or
calls to change the structure and balance of the IACs.
80. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 1, at 144.
81. Id.
82. See generally Barclay, supra note 60; Oldfather, supra note 65.
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their negative effects.83
If an “unfair” proceeding undermines the legitimacy of the authority making
that decision, those effects are magnified when the party calls attention to that
unfairness. This initial unfairness is compounded when a second authority, tasked
with identifying and remedying unfairness below, blesses the failing as perfectly
acceptable within the system. When IACs affirm and reinforce procedural
deficiencies, the deficiency infects the appeal and undermines the legitimacy of
the entire system. This degradation of faith in the system is multiplied when the
process for review raises the exact same procedural justice concerns as the action
being reviewed. When parties appeal their case to address a lack of voice or
dignity in the process but receive only a summary affirmance without the
opportunity to tell their story, they may hear that their exclusion from the system
is a feature, not a bug.
These concerns are especially weighty for the last authority to review the case.
The body with whom the buck stops is both the last line of defense to rectify any
mistakes, and the source for any actual or perceived tone at the top. An actual or
de facto court of last resort that summarily affirms deficient procedure sends a
clear message to both the lower bodies and the parties.
Thus, aggregate procedural justice concerns incorporate the entire
adjudicatory system, asking all bodies tasked with review—but especially the
final review—to consider the procedure experienced below. If the body identifies
any procedural justice issues below, it should alter its procedure to remedy that
deficiency.
Aggregate procedural justice concerns are theoretically boundless; an
appellate body would need to respond to any of a near infinite number of ways
in which the lower body may have failed the parties. The United States has
limited the potential concerns, however, by incorporating lower procedure into
substantive review.84 Because litigants still care most about outcomes, an
authority likely need not account for past process deficiencies where the affected
party wins on appeal, especially when the party wins because of the deficiency.85
In light of this substantive review, aggregate procedural justice concerns
likely only arise when the lower procedure undermines a party’s faith in the
system without offending substantive law—that is, when the IAC will affirm the
lower court despite the problematic procedure. In these cases, the reviewing body
should take care to ensure that the parties have a voice and that the body fully

83. McAlister has also made a similar suggestion—in passing—about the aggregate effects of
procedural justice concerns. See McAlister, supra note 6, at 566 (“[T]he appellants expectations as to
reason-giving may vary depending on the extent of process received at the trial level.”).
84. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 1, at 140–46 (discussing the similarities and differences of
procedural justice and procedural due process).
85. Consider, for example, Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990), where the Supreme Court issued
a three paragraph per curiam opinion without oral argument. Given the procedural deficiencies below,
such a summary disposition would arguably have raised aggregate procedural justice concerns, except
that the Court held that the procedure below violated the Due Process Clause and reversed the decision.
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explains why it must affirm the lower decision.86
Finally, because aggregate procedural justice concerns arise when the
reviewing court affirms deficient procedure below, the process arguably deviates
from the traditional conceptualization of procedural justice as always applying to
every party.87 Rather, aggregate concerns may arise unilaterally, only impacting
the appellant—that is, the trial court loser. For this reason, aggregate procedural
justice concerns may (depending on the appellant’s identity) arise differently in
appeals that, at first blush, appear very similar. Aggregate procedure may thus
cause ostensibly similar parties to experience an IAC’s procedure in vastly
different ways. Considering how aggregate procedural justice may impact these
parties might help researchers craft their studies and analyze results to ensure the
most accurate view of appellate procedure’s effects on litigants.
C. Comparing the Demands of Discrete and Aggregate Procedural Justice
Having described discrete and aggregate procedural justice concerns, it may
be helpful to further theorize when the categories might arise and what might be
required to remedy them. At the threshold, aggregate and procedural justice
concerns likely arise to different degrees depending on the specific facts of the
appeal and the parties. As discussed, discrete concerns apply categorically and
likely arise in much the same way that they do in the trial court. Conversely,
aggregate issues arise most acutely when: (1) the IAC is likely to affirm the lower
court, and (2) the lower court’s procedure was problematic, but nonetheless
permissible.
Though discrete and aggregate procedural justice concerns may arise to
different degrees in different appeals, they need not impose different demands
on the IACs. Because discrete procedural justice conceives of the appeal as
essentially a new trial, the demands are likely similar to those of a new trial.
Relatedly, any aggregate procedural justice concerns may well be remedied by a
new trial with sufficient process. In its purest form then, de novo review of the
trial or relevant issue arguably cures all aggregate concerns provided the
procedure on review is discretely sufficient.
To be sure, IACs lack the judicial resources to provide de novo review of
every appeal. But even where the IAC does not completely replicate the initial
review, discrete procedural justice concerns—combined with substantive
considerations of procedure—may still respond to potential aggregate concerns.
This phenomenon can be seen in the historical Learned Hand model of appellate
review. The participation, trustworthiness, and dignity of a complete opinion
following full oral argument likely remedied much of the harm from deficient

86. Because the outcome of the case cannot be definitively known at the time procedure is set,
appellate bodies should focus on those cases or types of cases with a high potential for an affirmance that
would further undermine a party’s faith in the system. This still will likely be less than all of a certain type
of appeal. See infra Part IV.C.2.
87. Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 1, at 145.
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procedure below, especially where the appeal resulted in reversal.88
Thus, aggregate and discrete procedural justice demands only diverge when
(1) the IAC reviews an appeal under deferential standards, shifting the derivative
suit away from a de facto new trial; (2) the IAC finds problematic procedure
below nonetheless substantively permissible; and (3) the procedure required to
satisfy discrete concerns is insufficient to also satisfy aggregate concerns. In other
words, tier-two cases.
From the first instances of relaxing appellate process, decisions on procedure
were explicitly predicated on the complexity of the case and the marginal
improvement in decisional accuracy.89 Under the two-tier regime, tier one
cases—often brought by corporate parties or repeat players—receive the
Learned Hand treatment because they raise complex issues with difficult
answers.90 Meanwhile, tier-two procedure is predicated on the theory that a
decision is easy and that increased participation would not aid deliberation.91
Consideration of the procedure afforded to the parties below, or of the intrinsic
benefits flowing from appellate procedure, are absent from this system.
Many of these changes were made in pursuit of judicial efficiency, which
remains a central concern for the federal courts. But his Note’s critique has a
silver lining: When aggregate and discrete concerns diverge in a given case, the
procedures required to remedy them also diverge. Specifically, because aggregate
procedural justice issues only arise based on the specific procedure below,
remedies can be much more focused. Only those cases where an appealing party
received deficient procedure below need require increased procedures. Thus,
rather than apply new procedure to entire classes of cases, the IAC can likely
remedy aggregate concerns with flexible approaches that seek to identify and
remedy individual cases.
IV
AGGREGATE PROCEDURAL JUSTICE IN ACTION: THE SURGE IN ASYLUM
CASES
The case of United States asylum appeals in the early twenty-first century
provides a helpful real-world example of how aggregate procedural justice
88. Indeed, Richman and Reynolds suggest that the Learned Hand Model upheld the “guarantee
of justice to all in equal measure.” Richman & Reynolds, supra note 42, at 297.
89. See, e.g., id. at 296 (The standard explanation for the existence of different tracks of justice is
that some cases are more ‘important’ than others.”); Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) (requiring oral argument
unless, inter alia, “the dispositive issue . . . [has] been authoritatively decided” or “the decisional process
would not be significantly aided by oral argument”).
90. See Levy, supra note 42, at 334 (noting that circuit screening bodies recommend oral argument
based on “several factors, including the novelty of the issues . . . , the number of issues raised, the number
of parties, . . . the size of the record, . . . [and] . . . whether the appellant is represented by counsel.”).
91. See Jon O. Newman, The Second Circuit’s Expedited Adjudication of Asylum Cases: A Case
Study of a Judicial Response to an Unprecedented Problem of Caseload Management, 74 BROOK. L. REV.
429, 436 (2008) (defending a lack of oral argument in asylum appeals because the benefits “would not
have been significant” and because internal screeners “invariably provide more insightful and
comprehensive analysis”).
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concerns may deviate from discrete justice concerns, how the current two-tier
system of appellate process potentially ignores such aggregate concerns, and how
the IACs could address these aggregate concerns without being crushed under
an exploding docket.
A. Factual Background: Asylum Review
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and subsequent amendments
control modern U.S. immigration policy.92 These laws govern the process by
which foreign nationals apply for asylum in the United States.93 The Departments
of Justice (DOJ) and Homeland Security (DHS) share joint responsibility for
implementing the INA, including the asylum process.94 The DOJ and DHS have
promulgated joint regulations defining the procedure for reviewing requests for
asylum and refugee status, as well as the system for appealing such decisions.95
1. The Asylum Application Process
The administrative framework requires individuals first apply for asylum and
have their case adjudicated by either (or both) an Asylum Officer in the United
States Customs and Immigration Services (USCIS) or an Immigration Judge (IJ).
An IJ is an Administrative Law Judge in the DOJ’s Executive Office for
Immigration Review (Immigration Court).96 Both the Asylum Officer and IJ
constitute legal adjudicators, but the IJ’s role is quasi-judicial, and proceedings
before the IJ resemble litigation.97
In all cases, the asylum applicant has the burden of proving that she is eligible
for asylum as a refugee under the statutory definition before any decision to stay
deportation can be made.98 The exact process changes, however, depending on
whether the application is: (1) an affirmative application, (2) a defensive
application, or (3) a credible fear application.99
An affirmative application occurs when an individual in the United States,

92. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965); see Erika Lee,
Immigrants and Immigration Law: A State of the Field Assessment, J. AM. ETHNIC HIST., Summer 1999,
at 85, 94. Immigration laws are collected in Title 8 of the United States Code.
93. 8 U.S.C. § 1103.
94. Id.
95. 8 C.F.R.
96. See infra notes 107–116 and accompanying text.
97. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Org. & Functions Manual §17(D).
98. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a). The applicant’s testimony alone may satisfy this burden, provided it is
“credible.” AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2020),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/asylum_in_the_united_states.p
df [https://perma.cc/QM9U-VGEJ].
99. See ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG. RES. SERV., R45549, IMMIGRATION: U.S. ASYLUM POLICY 2
(2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R45539.pdf [https://perma.cc/HT2D-RGB2]. (describing the
affirmative application as a voluntary application for asylum that is filed while the applicant is not in
removal proceedings, defensive applications as occurring after removal proceedings have been initiated,
and a credible fear application as occurring when an individual raises credible fears of harm in their home
country only once stopped at the border).
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and not in removal proceedings, voluntarily applies for asylum.100 In these cases,
an Asylum Officer interviews the applicant; reviews the application; and either
grants, denies, or refers the application to an IJ for further proceeding.101 If an
application is denied and the applicant does not have a valid visa, the Asylum
Officer will initiate removal proceedings and refer the case to an IJ for further
proceedings (including a defensive application).102
A defensive asylum application occurs when an applicant requests asylum
after removal proceedings have been initiated against her, thus as a defense to
deportation.103 Removal proceedings may occur after a failed affirmative
application or after independent immigration enforcement.104 In reviewing
defensive applications, the IJ takes the place of an Asylum Officer, holding a
hearing to receive the applicant’s testimony and review any additional evidence,
and ultimately deciding whether the applicant has carried her burden.105 The IJ’s
ultimate decision may be written or oral, but an adverse finding must include the
reasons for denial.106
The third application—a credible fear application—occurs when individuals
raise asylum claims after being stopped at the border. Individuals who meet
certain statutory requirements may affirmatively apply for asylum at a port-ofentry.107 But most applicants stopped at the border fail to meet these requirement
and are placed in expedited removal proceedings.108 When these individuals raise
their asylum claims, they technically make a defensive application.109 Instead of
receiving the traditional defensive review though, these individuals are diverted
to an interview with an Asylum Officer to determine “whether the [applicant]

100. Id. at 3.
101. Id. at 3–4.
102. 8 C.F.R. § 208.14(c).
103. EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGR. REV. (EOIR), U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FY 2018 STATS. YB 24 (2019),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/1198896/download [https://perma.cc/8HUW-NA9F].
104. BRUNO, supra note 100, at 5.
105. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(e).
106. Id. § 1240.11(c)(4); see also id. §1240.12.
107. Id. § 208.2(a).
108. CONCHITA CRUZ, AMIT JAIN, JOANNE LEE, ERIKA NYBORG-BURCH, SWAPNA REDDY,
CLAIRE SIMONICH, DOROTHY TEGELER, & LIZ WILLIS, ASYLUM SEEKER ADVOC. PROJECT,
VINDICATING THE RIGHTS OF ASYLUM SEEKERS AT THE BORDER AND BEYOND 8 (2018) [hereinafter
ASYLUM SEEKER ADVOC. PROJECT] (citing INA §§ 235, 240 and Designating Aliens for Expedited
Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877, 48,880 (Aug. 11, 2004)), https://asylumadvocacy.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/06/ASAP-Expedited-Removal-Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BMG-AN2M]; see
also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7) (codifying the documentation requirements for the admissibility of immigrants
and nonimmigrants). In 2017, Customs and Border Patrol apprehended 181,440 foreign nationals; and
103,704 individuals were removed through expedited removal. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS,
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., Annual Report: Immigration Enforcement Actions: 2017, at 12 tbl.6 (2019),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/enforcement_actions_2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GB8K-U5EW].
109. See BRUNO, supra note 100, at 6 (explaining that when DHS determines an individual is
inadmissible, that individual can rebut that by deciding to apply for asylum, which requires a showing of
credible fear to “defend” against removal).
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has a credible fear of returning to their home country.”110 This credible fear
interview, often performed in an immigration detention center, tasks the
applicant with convincing an Asylum Officer that there is a “significant
possibility” that the applicant qualifies as a refugee.111
If the applicant satisfies this burden, the application proceeds to Immigration
Court as a defensive application.112 If the applicant cannot convince the Asylum
Officer, she will be deported unless she requests review by an IJ.113 The IJ reviews
the record from the interview and makes a de novo credible fear determination.114
If the IJ finds a significant possibility that the applicant qualifies for asylum, the
removal order is vacated and the case proceeds as a defensive application.115 If
the IJ finds no significant possibility, DHS will deport the applicant.116
2. The Classic Model of Reviewing Asylum Applications
Decisions by an IJ are usually appealable to either (or both) the federal courts
or the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)—another body within the
Immigration Court. The availability of, and specific process for, appeals to these
bodies has varied over time. For our purposes, it is worth first considering the
classic model of asylum appeals that existed until the early twenty-first century.
Except when an IJ rejects an applicant’s credible fear claim, applicants may
appeal an IJ’s rejection of their asylum applications to the BIA.117 This quasijudicial body functions like an intermediate court of appeals.118 In the 1990s, the
BIA consisted of twenty-three members, who reviewed IJ decisions in threemember panels.119 Panels reviewed the IJ decision de novo and had the power to
engage in new factfinding or to alter an IJ’s discretionary decision.120 The BIA
reversed in approximately twenty-five percent of appeals.121
110. ASYLUM SEEKER ADVOC. PROJECT, supra note 108, at 13.
111. Id. at 13, 26–27 (describing the “significant possibility” standard and the interview process by
which an individual would attempt to meet that standard); see also BRUNO, supra note 100, at 6 (same).
112. Id. at 6 (noting that establishing credible fear leads to a referral for a full hearing in front of an
immigration judge).
113. 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(g).
114. Id. § 1208.30(g)(1) & (2)(ii).
115. Id. § 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(B).
116. Id. § 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(A).
117. Id. § 1003.1(b); see also id. § 1208.30(g)(2)(iv)(A) (“The immigration judge’s decision
[concurring that no credible fear exists] is final and may not be appealed.”).
118. See DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS: PROCEDURAL REFORMS
TO IMPROVE CASE MANAGEMENT 9 (2003), available at https://www.ilw.com/articles/2003,1126dorsey.pdf [https://perma.cc/S3XA-L679] (“The BIA is a quasi-judicial body with exclusively appellate
functions. It historically has served two purposes: deciding appeals of individual cases and issuing
precedential decisions for guidance to the Service and the Immigration Judges.”).
119. Id. at 20–21.
120. Id. at 10 (quoting Charles Gordon et. al. Immigration Law and Procedure § 3.5[5](b) (2003))
(“[T]he Board may make a de novo review of the record and make its own conclusions and findings
irrespective of those made by the Special Inquiry Officer.”).
121. Comm. on Fed. Courts, Ass’n of B. of City of N.Y., The Surge of Immigration Appeals and Its
Impact on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, 60 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 243, 245 [hereinafter The
Surge] (citing DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, supra note 118, at app. 24).
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Further, until the early 2000s, both the district and circuit courts exercised
jurisdiction to review asylum decisions by the Immigration Court. First, the
District Courts exercised jurisdiction over petitions on writ of habeas corpus from
individuals challenging their deportation orders while in custody.122
Second, the Circuit Courts exercise jurisdiction to review most final orders of
removal, including those following rejection of an asylum application.123 Final
removal orders are appealable to the circuit in which IJ making the decision
resides.124 Most asylum decisions are rendered in either the Second or Ninth
Circuits.125
Historically, the Second Circuit included almost all immigration appeals in its
Civil Appeals Management Plan (CAMP).126 CAMP seeks to expedite and clarify
the appeal while encouraging resolutions with minimal participation by judges.127
The program revolves around Staff Counsel, full-time attorneys within the court
system.128 Staff Counsel conducts pre-argument conferences, attended by counsel
for both parties (and sometimes the parties themselves), where the parties can
state their view of the facts and issues.129 The goal of these conferences is to limit
the issues on appeal or if possible negotiate a resolution before oral argument.130
Staff Counsel also responds to the parties’ arguments, pointing out weakness and
suggesting withdrawal when a case seems hopeless.131
Under this system, as high as sixty-four percent of immigration appeals were
disposed of after pre-argument conferences.132 And this success was bilateral:
Cases were disposed because the applicants withdrew their appeal and because
the government agreed to rehear a case in Immigration Court or to grant an
application.133

122. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(10) (1995) (repealed 1996); Elizabeth Cronin, When the Deluge Hits and
You Never Saw the Storm: Asylum Overload and the Second Circuit, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 547, 549 (2007).
123. Cronin, supra note 122, at 548. See also Erick Rivero, Note, Asylum and Oral Argument: The
Judiciary in Immigration and the Second Circuit Non-Argument Calendar, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1497,
1499 (2006) (citing Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, §
440(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1276–77, (1996)) (“While the AEDPA amended [INA] section 106 subject matter
jurisdiction, abrogating judicial review of removal orders issued pursuant to a conviction for an
aggravated felony, it did not affect judicial review of denied asylum applications.”). Orders of removal
become final once the deadline for appeal to the BIA passes, or once the BIA affirms the order. Cronin,
supra note 122, at 548. This includes petitions from a negative credible fear determination. See id. at 550
(listing denials of asylum as one of the final orders over which circuit courts have jurisdiction).
124. Id. at 548.
125. See, e.g., EOIR, supra note 103, at 25 tbl.13 (showing the New York City heard 11,029 asylum
claims—the most of any city—and that Los Angeles and San Francisco each heard approximately 4,000).
126. Cronin, supra note 123, at 553.
127. Irving R. Kaufman Must Every Appeal Run the Gamut?—The Civil Appeals Management Plan,
95 YALE L. J. 755, 756 (1986).
128. Id. at 757 n.8.
129. Id. at 757–58.
130. Id. at 758.
131. Id.
132. Cronin, supra note 123, at 553.
133. Id.
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B. The Asylum Appeal Surge
In the 1990s, the United States made a number of changes regarding its
approach to immigration, especially its enforcement of undocumented
immigration.134 These changes drove an increase in removal proceedings and a
corresponding increase in both asylum claims and asylum appeals.135
By 1999, the BIA faced a docket backlog numbering in the tens of
thousands.136 In response, the BIA Chairman instituted a pilot program that
designated categories of cases as suitable for a streamlined procedure.137 These
cases were reviewed by one permanent BIA member rather than the traditional
three-member panel.138 If the IJ’s decision below met certain conditions, this onemember panel could summarily affirm the decisions without any oral argument
or opinion and dismiss the case.139 The chairman initially limited this Affirmance
Without Opinion (AWO) system in the asylum context to decisions below
rendered on procedural grounds or under specific settled precedent,140 or to
appeals that were procedurally barred (for example, untimely appeals or appeals
in cases that became moot).141
The backlog continued to grow, however, and in early 2002—reeling from
September 11th and staring down a backlog now 57,000 cases deep—Attorney
General Ashcroft allowed the BIA to massively expand its pilot program.142
These reforms included substantive and procedural changes intended to increase
the rate at which the BIA affirmed IJs in three ways.143
Most notably, the regulations removed de novo review of factual issues—
establishing a clear error standard for reviewing factual determinations—and
stripped the BIA of its fact-finding powers.144 Further, the reforms expanded
AWO cases, “mak[ing] single-member adjudication the default procedure.”145 A
134. Newman, supra note 91, at 430.
135. Id.
136. John R.B. Palmer, Stephen W. Yale-Loehr & Elizabeth Cronin, Why Are So Many People
Challenging Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal Court? An Empirical Analysis of the
Recent Surge in Petitions for Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 22–23 (2005).
137. DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, supra note 118, at 15–17.
138. Id. at 17.
139. Id.
140. Id. app. 3 at 3–5 (allowing AWO in asylum claims regarding conviction of an aggravated felony
“unless there is a substantial legal question” whether the applicant was convicted of such a felony).
141. Id. app.3 at 5–6; see also Palmer et. al., supra note 136, at 24–25 (listing the initial categories of
cases “appropriate for single-member affirmance without an opinion” and listing two categories the BIA
Chairman added later).
142. See DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, supra note 118, at 16–17, 19 (noting, for example, that the BIA
Chairman in 2002 expanded the “certain categories of cases” that could be subject to AWO to “all
cases”). See generally John D. Ashcroft & Kris W. Kobach, A More Perfect System: The 2002 Reforms of
the Board of Immigration Appeals, 58 DUKE L.J. 1991 (2009).
143. See DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, supra note 118, at 20 (listing the DOJ’s changes to the BIA
appeal process, including changes to the standards of review, and the structure and composition of the
BIA itself).
144. Id. at 22.
145. See Palmer et. al., supra note 136, at 28.
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screening panel of employees within the BIA now assigns all appeals for singlemember adjudication unless the appeal meets one of six conditions signaling
sufficient importance to go before a full panel.146 The single board member must
affirm without opinion whenever the IJ’s decision is correct, errors are harmless
or non-material, and the case raises no substantial issues and is “squarely
controlled” by existing BIA precedent.147 Finally, the rules also impose hard time
limits for ultimate decisions and briefing schedules and remove any oral
argument from non-panel cases.148
This streamlined procedure for BIA review substantially increased the rate
of dispositions. In 1999, the BIA completed just over 23,000 cases.149 By 2004, the
yearly disposition rate peaked at nearly 49,000 decisions.150 Further, most of these
decisions were affirmances, especially AWOs.151 The rate at which the BIA
granted relief to an appellant fell from twenty-five percent to just ten percent.152
In the wake of the BIA’s increased affirmances of IJ decisions, immigration
attorneys turned to the habeas petition to challenge Immigration Court decisions
in the District Courts.153 Congress responded to this in 2005 by passing the REAL
ID Act, which stripped the District Courts of any authority to review the
Immigration Court’s determination that an asylum applicant lacked a credible
fear of persecution.154
This changing immigration procedure, BIA streamlining, and District Court
jurisdiction stripping precipitated a “surge” of appeals to the circuit courts in the
early 2000s, especially the Second Circuit.155 Most notably, both the number and
rate of appeals from the BIA increased. The reasons for the rate increase are
146. DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, supra note 118, at 21.
147. Id. at 23–24.
148. Id. at 24–25. For good measure, the Attorney General also reduced the Board’s membership
from twenty-three to eleven permanent members—fewer than sat just before Congress’ reforms in 1995.
Id. at 24. The stated rationale was that the increase had not “appreciably reduced the backlogs” and had
undermined “cohesiveness and collegiality.” Id. Some observers have noted however, that the first
members cut were also the most likely to reverse an adverse IJ decision. John R.B. Palmer, The Nature
and Causes of the Immigration Surge in the Federal Courts of Appeal: A Preliminary Analysis, 51 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 13, 24 (2006).
149. EOIR, 2003 STAT. YB S2 fig.27 (2004),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2008/04/18/fy03syb.pdf [https://perma.cc/3FHJBR9Q].
150. EOIR, 2006 STAT. YB S2 fig.25 (2007),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2008/04/18/fy04syb.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9EQBCAZ].
151. AWOs also increased—from less than ten percent of all cases during the pilot program, to sixty
percent by the end of 2002. The Surge, supra note 121.
152. Id. (citing DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, supra note 118, at app. 25).
153. See Cronin, supra note 122, at 549.
154. Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B § 106, 119 Stat. 231, 310 (2005) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(2)(A)); see also Dept. of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1968–69 (holding that
the Suspension Clause does not protect writs of habeas corpus that “permit a petitioner to claim that
right to enter or remain in a country, or to obtain administrative review potentially leading to that
result”).
155. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 91; The Surge, supra note 121.
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hotly debated.156 John Palmer, Stephen Yale-Loehr, and Elizabeth Cronin set out
to empirically test a number of potential reasons, including increased error,
denied applicants with higher expulsion costs, and more non-detained aliens
wishing to stay in the Country.157 The data could not exclude any of the proposed
causes, but supported the theory that dissatisfaction with the BIA procedure,
coupled with a spike in removal orders, compelled applicants and immigration
lawyers to shift their focus to the Circuit Courts.158
Regardless of the cause, by March 2004, applicants were appealing a quarter
of all BIA decisions, up from less than five percent before the reforms.159 More
than two-thirds of these appeals were brought in either the Second or Ninth
Circuits.160 In three years, the number of agency cases before the Second
Circuit—the overwhelming majority of which were BIA appeals—rose from
under 700 per year to almost 5,300 (over fifty percent of its entire docket) in
2005.161
Faced with this deluge, the Second Circuit implemented a non-argument
calendar system to screen all appeals from the BIA.162 Under this system, the Staff
Attorney’s Office at the Second Circuit receives all briefs and records for BIA
appeals.163 A law clerk in the office reviews these documents and prepares a
memorandum and draft summary order recommending a specific disposition.164
Each week, the office sends the completed summary orders (along with the
supporting documents) to a panel of three judges who vote sequentially on the
case.165 The judges vote on a sheet that provides five options: refer to the regular
argument calendar, deny, grant, remand, or other.166 Additionally, the Second
Circuit has removed all BIA appeals from CAMP participation.167 The nonargument calendar is now the only system for adjudicating asylum appeals.168
The non-argument calendar succeeded in decreasing the Second Circuit’s
administrative backlog from 5,000 cases in 2005 to under 1,000 by 2015, where it
156. For example, Judge Newman, posits that the shorter wait at the BIA has left applicants searching
for a new way to extend their time in the United States. See Newman, supra note 91, at 431. The New
York City Bar, however, concluded that increase came from a sense of aggrievement and concern that
the BIA’s summary procedure increased the risk of error. See The Surge, supra note 121, at 245.
157. See generally supra note 136, at 22–23.
158. Id. at 94.
159. Newman, supra note 91, at 431 (citing Palmer et. al., supra note 136, at 53 fig.5).
160. Id. at 431 n.19.
161. The Second Circuit had 696 administrative appeals pending on September 30, 2002. ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 2003 ANN. REP.
72 tbl.B-1 (2004). By September 30, 2005, the administrative appeals docket had increased to 5,299 cases.
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 2005
ANN. REP. 102 tbl.B-1 (2006).
162. See Newman, supra note 91, at 432–34.
163. Id. at 434.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Cronin, supra note 122, at 554.
168. Id.
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has remained since.169 The majority of cases on the non-argument calendar are
disposed of by affirming the BIA in an unpublished decision.170
C. Appellate Procedural Justice in the Asylum Surge
The story of the Surge provides insight into discrete and aggregate procedural
justice in three important ways. The Surge shows: (1) how IACs implicate
aggregate procedural justice by their decisions regarding appellate procedure, (2)
how discrete and aggregate procedural justice concerns may arise differently in
facially similar cases, and (3) how programs like CAMP enable IACs to remedy
aggregate concerns with targeted procedural changes rather than sweeping
reforms.
1. Aggregate Procedural Justice and Asylum Appeals
Whether the BIA or Second Circuit’s procedure for asylum appeals violate
the Due Process Clause, the INA, or notions of discrete procedural justice are
outside the scope of this Note.171 But the story of the Surge and judicial response
shows how aggregate procedural justice concerns may arise in the appellate
courts.
At the threshold, asylum applications are the type of American adjudication
likely to raise procedural justice concerns in the first instance. First, applications
are made by individuals who the government seeks to remove from the United
States. Given the potential consequences of removal proceedings, individuals in
removal proceedings are analogous to criminal defendants,172 and thus uniquely
affected by procedural justice concerns.173 Further, the initial proceedings are
overseen within the agency tasked with removing the applicants. Asylum Officers
are agents of the agency tasked with removing foreign nationals, and, even with
the statutory independence provided to them,174 ALJs like the IJs likely raise
more independence concerns than judges. Finally, many circuits, including the
Second, have recognized that Immigration Court often fails to provide asylum
applicants with adequate dignity or a reasoned decision.175
169. The data discussed in this sentence derive from a review of the JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE
UNITED STATES, ANNUAL REPORTS for the years 2005-2018, tbls.B-1 available at
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/analysis-reports/judicial-business-united-states-courts
[https://perma.cc/M2YD-JXNX].
170. Cronin, supra note 122, at 555.
171. For an example of such arguments, see generally Eric Rivero, Note, Asylum and Oral Argument:
The Judiciary in Immigration and the Second Circuit Non-Argument Calendar, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1497
(2006).
172. For a discussion of the overlapping characteristics of the criminal law and civil removal
proceedings, see generally Jennifer M. Cachón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the
Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Right, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563 (2010).
173. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
174. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d).
175. See, e.g., Niam v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 652, 654 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he elementary principles of
administrative law, the rules of logic, and common sense seem to have eluded the Board in this as in other
sentences.”); Seceida-Rosales v. I.N.S., 331 F.3d 297, 312 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that the IJ “relied on a
number of inappropriate standards . . . and erroneously resorted to speculation and conjecture”).
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Additionally, the standard of review suggests that these cases raise aggregate
procedural justice concerns. Most asylum appeals challenge an IJ’s adverse
credibility finding.176 The Circuits review this credibility finding under the highly
deferential substantial evidence standard: affirming the decision unless “the
record demonstrates that any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to
conclude to the contrary.”177 This deferential standard drives a high affirmance
rate. As such, these immigration cases—long-shot error cases, brought by
members of a marginalized group who may feel aggrieved by the procedure
below—raise serious aggregate procedural justice concerns.
The BIA review process provides a case study in aggregate procedural
concerns. As discussed, decreasing appellate procedure at the BIA led to an
increase in the rate of appeals to the circuit courts.178 Something then, beyond
just the number of dispositions, motivated applicants to appeal when statistically
they otherwise would have accepted the BIA’s disposition. Palmer and others
hypothesized that the BIA changes triggered “a fundamental shift in behavior
among lawyers and [applicants], causing them to focus their litigation in the
federal courts.”179 Further, the New York Bar Association’s Committee on
Federal Courts argued that the decreased procedure left applicants “aggrieved”
and feeling that they might be “deported without being accorded meaningful
administrative review.”180 Finally, Palmer, in another paper, suggested that the
BIA procedures may have driven applicants to push forward with appeals to the
circuit courts “regardless of whether or not they [had] a realistic chance of
success.”181
Thus, the literature reveals, applicants were at least partially motivated by a
feeling that the BIA changes left them without any real process to tell their story,
and that they appealed to the circuits to vindicate their claims regardless of
success. That is, they were motivated by aggregate procedural justice concerns.
2. The Differential Approach
In light of the aggregate procedural justice concerns motivating the surge in
appeals, the Second Circuit’s focus on accuracy and discrete concerns in crafting
its procedural response may compound those problems. But this story also shows
how those problems may not affect all asylum appeals the same way. The type of
case known as asylum appeals can actually be thought of as seven types of cases
through the aggregate procedural justice lens.182

176. Newman, supra note 91, at 433 (“[M]ost asylum cases present a single issue—whether an adverse
credibility finding by the BIA is supported by substantial evidence.”).
177. See Andrew Tae-Hyun Kim, Rethinking Review Standards in Asylum, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV.
581, 587–88 (2013).
178. See supra notes 155–158 and accompanying text.
179. Palmer et al., supra note 136, at 94.
180. The Surge, supra note 121.
181. Palmer, supra note 148, at 29.
182. A case called an “asylum appeal” and automatically scheduled for non-argument may actually
be: (1) an affirmative application with full BIA review, (2) an affirmative application and AWO, (3) a
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First, a case will raise different procedural justice questions depending on
whether it begins as an affirmative, defensive, or credible fear application. Thus,
each type of case implicates different aggregate procedural justice concerns on
appeal. Applicants may spend substantial time and effort constructing an
affirmative application, and an affirmative application only reaches an IJ if an
Asylum Officer first denies it. Thus, an affirmative applicant will have had two
full opportunities for argument and decision making before reaching the circuit.
Conversely, a defensive application is prepared while in custody and directly
reviewed by the IJ. Moreover, an application in defense of removal proceedings
has a strong odor of illegitimacy and thus may not receive as much respect as a
completely voluntary application.183 In this sense then, appeals from defensive
applications raise substantially more potential aggregate concerns than
affirmative applications. Credible fear interviews present a more complex
situation: they have some aspects of an affirmative application (like multiple
reviews) and aspects of defensive applications (like the conditions and timing for
preparation, and indicia of incredibility).
Further, as discussed above, the BIA adds an additional wrinkle to the
aggregate procedural justice analysis. First, an appeal from an adverse credible
fear interview receives no BIA review and so comes to the circuit court on a path
all its own. Further, appeals from the BIA might have received procedure rivaling
the Learned Hand Model or might have received an AWO, with the AWO
appeals raising far more aggregate concerns.
3. CAMP as a Targeted Remedy for Aggregate Concerns
Finally, from this recognition that facially similar appeals may raise very
different aggregate procedural justice concerns, the story of the Surge shows how
courts may use targeted reforms to efficiently remedy aggregate procedural
justice. CAMP provided valuable benefits in asylum appeals before the Surge,
but docket increases made it impossible to maintain the program for all
appeals.184 As just shown, however, reforms need not apply to every asylum
appeal, at least not if it is only aimed at aggregate procedural justice concerns.
The Second Circuit could partially reintegrate CAMP for those sub-types of
asylum appeals raising the most aggregate procedural justice concerns to avoid
being again crushed by the weight of every asylum appeal.
Some might argue that this change would incentivize applicants to target a
defensive application with full BIA review, (4) a defensive application and AWO, (5) a negative credible
fear determination, (6) a positive credible fear determination-turned-defensive application with full BIA
review, or (7) a positive credible fear determination-turned-defensive application and AWO. The
paradigmatic case for all of these pose different potential aggregate procedural justice concerns.
183. Many Americans share the view that foreign nationals are exploiting “asylum loopholes” to gain
entry to United States. See Laurel Wamsley, Trump Calls for Asylum-Seekers to Pay Fees, Proposing
New Restrictions, NPR (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/04/30/718627010/trump-calls-forasylum-seekers-to-pay-fees-proposing-new-restrictions [https://perma.cc/ZF52-TFS9]. Moreover, some
have argued that foreign nationals may raise (or appeal) defensive asylum applications to delay removal.
See Newman, supra note 91, at 431–32.
184. Cronin, supra note 122, at 554–55.
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specific method of application, but the substantive law constrains those perverse
incentives. Aggregate procedural justice concerns are most weighty in the types
of cases with the least likelihood of substantive success. Thus, since parties care
most about outcomes, they would likely opt for application methods not subject
to CAMP, if given the chance.
V
CONCLUSION
The arguments presented in the Note are highly theoretical. Empirical
research has barely begun to address appellate procedural justice in general, and
without understanding what procedure individuals expect on appeal, we cannot
know whether they expect more in light of a procedural failing experience below.
But procedural justice theory has always preceded empirical study.
Considering the impact of the position of the IACs within the greater legal system
may help researchers better analyze data on procedural justice concerns in
appellate procedure. Further, when IACs and scholars consider what level of
procedure is due on appeal, considering the impact of the procedure below may
open up unique reform alternatives that balance justice concerns and finite
judicial resources.
If the IACs do not consider the experiences that the parties bring to filling an
appeal, their procedures may risk affirming not just the judgment of the trial
court, but its treatment of the parties as well.

